In this paper I introduce the notion of bilogics, namely logics interpreted over a pair of structures, in contrast to classical logic and many of its variations, the formulae of which are interpreted over one structure. In particular, I introduce and study Contrastive Logic, suitable for expressing contrast and conformity between the two structures involved.
Introduction
The traditional semantics of most logical systems is such that a (closed) formula is interpreted as a statement about satisfaction in one structure, called a model of that formula. Satisfaction is then naturally extended for collections of formulae. The structures of interpretation are chosen in accordance with the intended application of the logic at hand. For example, assignments of truth values to propositional variables for propositional logic, rst-order structures for the rst-order predicate calculus, Kripke structures for modal logics, sequences of states for (linear-time) temporal logic, etc.
In this paper I introduce and investigate logical systems in which the formulae receive their natural semantic interpretation over classes of related structures. Thus, such (closed) formulae do not make an absolute statement about one speci c structure (of the appropriate format). Rather, satisfaction is de ned by a certain relationship among the structures in the class over which the formula is interpreted.
Note that this is essentially di erent from the possible-worlds semantics of modalities, which also involves a class of worlds. There, satisfaction is still a binary relation between some formula and one world w, a relation de ned in terms of satisfaction of other formulae (usually subformulae of ) in other worlds. It is not the case that a formula makes a joint-statement about the whole class. The latter is exactly the situation in the logics studied here. More on the relationship to Modal logic appears in the Conclusions section. This paper restricts attention to logics requiring an ordered pair hS; Ai of structures (of an appropriate format) for their interpretation. I refer to such logics as bilogics. Connectives in bilogics are referred to as bilogical connectives. In particular, I am interested in a special case of bilogics, called Contrastive (bi)logic, expressing contrast between the`state of a airs' in two structures over the same underlying domain (in the rst-order case), or conformity between the two structures. By means of this logic one is able to formalize the distinction between contrast and contradiction, a 726 Contrastive Logic distinction that was needed long ago but could not be achieved using classical logic.
A typical de nition of semantic satisfaction (`j =') in a bilogic has the form 1 hS; Ai j = iff S j = 1 and A j = 2 where 1 ; 2 are derived from in a way dependent on its main bilogical connective.
The one structure, S, is the standard world while the second structure, A, is the actual world. The world A has its usual meaning, representing a certain state of a airs, over which assertions are made in the usual logical way. The world S is a standard world in an application dependent way. It might represent the expected state of a airs, or the most probable state of a airs, or the state of a airs as it should have been (under a certain normative prescription), or one of many other interpretations. Assertions about the standard world are also made in the usual logical way. A major objective of the introduction of bilogics, and in particular the special case of Contrastive Logic, is a certain truth functional (though in an extended sense) formalization of certain natural-language particles, which have been considered hitherto as not amenable to such formalization. Instead, their treatment alluded to pragmatic rather than semantic treatment. In particular, I am interested in formalizing propositional contrastive connectives such as but and surprisingly, propositional conformal connectives such as truly and temporal connectives such as already or still. I elaborate on this issue in later sections.
At this point, however, I would like to stress that the paper is not an attempt to provide a comprehensive linguistic analysis as such, nor does it attempt to cope thoroughly with the bulk of available linguistic data. Rather, a major concern is forming the right abstraction out of the data and studying this abstraction. The focus is more on the approach and its relevance to semantics of natural language, than on the actual results obtained.
The bilogical operators are de ned formally based on the two (uninterpreted) structures. Only the formalization of natural language constructs by means of these operators depends on the particular interpretation of the standard world.
To give the avor of the development to follow, let us consider the informal semantics 2 of but. = . For simplicity, I am taking expectation here to be an extensional notion, represented by a world. It is known that the way expectation is expressed in natural language needs intensional means for its full characterization. An extensional de nition is a su cient approximation for the current needs. The second conjunct in the de nition captures the conjunctive assertive aspect by asserting that the conjunction ^ holds in the actual world. The rst conjunct says that in the standard world implies : , so in the standard world the conjunction ^ could never hold.
That is how the contrastive aspect is captured: There is a contrast between the the actual world and the standard world.
An interesting issue raised by the approach is the following. In classical logics, one has the notion of the class of all models of a closed formula (or a class of such formulae), de ned by
The question is, what is the analog de nition for bilogics. There seem to be two natural choices. = fA j hS; Ai j = g Both de nitions are compatible with the proposed approach, and both have interesting properties. The anchored approach renders bilogics closer to modal logics, as it proposes a way of interpreting statements over one world, keeping the other one xed. In the Conclusions section more is said about the relationship between A and S.
In the rest of this paper I concentrate on Contrastive Logics. In Section 2 I consider the propositional and rst-order framework. In Section 3 I consider a linear-time temporal logic framework. Each Contrastive Logic is related to the corresponding above mentioned natural language particles. Section 4 ends with conclusions and relationship to related work. Their usual truth-functional interpretation is assumed.
As a rst stage, I consider CL 1 , the at Contrastive Logic, without nesting of contrastive operators (neither within propositional connectives nor within themselves).
The syntax of CL 1 is presented in Table 1 . I now turn to the semantic de nition of CL 1 , presented in Table 2 . I use`j =' to ambiguously denote satisfaction both of a classical propositional formula over one world, and for the satisfaction of a contrastive formula over two worlds, leaving the distinction to context. Remark 2.1 (On the semantics) 1. From the semantic de nition,` ' is indeed seen to be a unary contrastive operator, in that its argument is asserted to hold in the actual world, while not holding in the standard world. Later we shall see that, depending on the interpretation of the standard world, di erent situations can be captured by this contrast. 2. Similarly,` ' is seen to be the unary conformity operator, asserting that its argument is satis ed both in the actual world and in the standard world. 3. The operator`!' has di erent meaning when apllied as a pre x operator than when applied as a su x operator. In both cases, it asserts the satisfaction of its argument in one of the structures: in the standard world when applied as a pre x operator, and in the actual world when applied as a su x operator 4 . Table 2 . Flat Propositional Contrastive Logic: Semantics 4. The operator` ' is the binary contrastive operator, asserting that both its arguments are satis ed in the actual world while not both are satis ed in the standard world. Here one can clearly see the di erence between contrast and contradiction, mentioned in the introduction. 5. Note that ! is actually equivalent to the classical proposition , and embeds the classical propositional calculus into propositional Contrastive Logic. In the sequel, I do not distinguish between ! and . As a rst attempt to understand the contrastive (and conformal) connectives, it is shown that they are not really independent, and can be interde ned. For that purpose, the ambiguity of logical notation is extended, and the equivalence of two contrastive propositions is de ned. A bilogical tautology is a bilogical proposition that is valid for every pair of assignments to the propositional variables in . This ts the unanchored approach mentioned above, were both assignments vary independently. One could also consider tautologies with respect to a xed standard world. I do not pursue this issue further here. Proposition 2.5 For no propositional and is a bilogical tautology.
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Proof. Assume is a bilogical tautology. By de nition, ^ has to be a tautology (in A), hence both and have to be tautologies. But then, ! : can not be a tautology (in S).
Note that the situation changes once contrastive propositions are embedded within negation. Also note that the binary contrastive connective does have bilogical contradictions (i.e., bilogical propositions that hold for no pair of assignments). For example, if is any usual propositional contradiction, then is a contradiction for any . In particular, so is false.
De ning contrastive and conformal natural-language particles
Let us return now to the issue of de ning the meaning of natural-language particles in a (generalized) truth functional way, using contrastive logic. As already mentioned where it was di cult previously to capture this`something else'. As already mentioned, there is no attempt for a comprehensive, linguistically adequate, characterization of all uses of but. Rather, I focus here on that use that ts the intuitive characterization above. In terms of the description in 15], we formalize the meaning resembling that of although, not the meaning resembling the (colloquially used) while, or whereas. Thus, the rst of the following two statements is captured, and not the second:
1. He is hungry but not eating 2. My dog is black but my cat is white A related discussion by W. I believe that such claims are not substantiated. While it is rather clear that no logical treatment can ever capture the full richness of meanings of any naturallanguage particle, and there is a limit to the power of extensional, truth-functional characterization, I do not agree to the current placement of this limit, and I strive to push it forward, extending the scope of applicability of such approaches.
I do so under the belief that linguistic research itself will bene t too from such an endeavor, similarly to the bene ts acrud by classical logic in the (albeit partial) characterization of and, or and not, the modal-logic characterization of possibility and necessity, the temporal-logic characterization of eventually, until, etc. In addition, extensional approaches should enhance the computational aspects of natural language understanding.
Using Contrastive Logic one can deal with contrast in a purely extensional, albeit slightly extended truth functional manner, not alluding to hearer or listener oriented pragmatics. For an approach explicitly advocating the latter, see, for example, 7] and 5].
I am not concerned here with the details of the nature of the expected world S, and in questions like what makes it expected. These are more properly dealt with either linguistically or philosophically. Some comments about a way to relate expectation to actuality appear in the Conclusions section. I do mention in passing, that this notion encapsulates at least two di erent grounds for expectation. The rst, global expectation, arises due to some general rules. For example in He is over ninety but can run a Marathon. the expectation is due to some general rules about aging. However, in Q: Do you collect Irish stamps? A: I collect old ones but I do not collect new ones. a local expectation (not due to any general rule) is generated by the question, by which collecting Irish stamps suggests collecting all of them or collecting none.
This approach can also accommodate the view of but in 23] , that ... its logical function is to overwrite defaults. ' We just have to take S as the default world.
Note, however, that this is an oversimpli cation. As is well-known from studies in AI, one can not assume a unique default world. Consider the following example. Suppose we have the following three default rules:
1. Adults are normally employed 2. Students are normally unemployed 3. Students are normally adults Applying the above simpli ed approach, we get 1. x is an adult but x is not employed for an x who is an exception of the rst rule. Similarly, 2. x is a student but x is employed for an x who is an exception of the second rule.
In trying to formulate all the default rules as general rules in the expected world S, e.g., as:
S j = 8x : adult(x) ! employed(x) S j = 8x : student(x) ! :employed(x) S j = 8x : student(x) ! adult(x) We immediately see that no such S may exist, as these three conditions are contradictory.
Thus, to cope better with default situations, a family of expected worlds, possibly partially ordered by a preference relation, is needed.
In the sequel, I retain the unique expected world, which su ces for my needs.
Note that under the above presented de nition of but, the absence of contrast between the two parts of a contrastive statement renders the statement false! For example, consider an account of a chess game, where I played white but you played black. Since there is no contrast between the two players playing opposite colors (rather the contrary holds), this statement turns to be false. Compare with 3] (p. 167), where a similar sentence is considered`odd', not false. This has a clear bearing on the meaning of negating contrastive statements, discussed below. The whole approach can be re ned by switching to a three-valued version of the logic, allowing also`unde ned' truth values, and incorporating 19] a theory of presuppositions. (See 21] for a criticism of the presuppositional account of contrast, but with a less satisfactory alternative means of treatment than provided here). As already mentioned, another possible extension is towards an intensional characterization of expectation. Such extensions are not treated here.
Note also that our explication of but is symmetric. Asymmetry enters the de nition as soon as and involve temporal operators. A more comprehensive discussion of this issue appears in the Conclusions section. The de nition also satis es the compositionality criterion posed in 9], a necessary condition for presence of a truthfunctional connective in natural language. The interpretation for a bilogic of their third criterion, namely that of confessionality, is not clear. If it should be applicable separately to each structure, than clearly our de nition of but violates it. It does hold if taken jointly for both structures.
To show the power of the approach, I consider some more applications of it at the purely propositional contrastive level. A later section considers temporally-related contrast.
Consider the unary natural-language particle surprisingly . It also has two aspects of its meaning.
An implication that holds -an assertive aspect. An implication of an astonishment of -an unexpectedness aspect.
If we once again interpret S as an expected world, one can de ne surprisingly df: = . Thus, surprise is captured as denial of expectation. As an interesting consequence of the bilogical equivalences stated above one gets the following equivalences for natural language expressions:
1.
surprisingly , but and surprisingly , true but 2. Another consequence is in the opposite direction.
but , surprisingly ( ^ ). Thus, surprisingly can be de ned in terms of but and vice-versa. This captures an intuitive understanding of contrast as a surprisingly holding conjunction, and of surprise as a self-contrast, a diagonalization of binary contrast (i.e., equating its two arguments), and also a contrast to an absolute truth.
Consider now the unary natural language particle truly (or sometimes also indeed ), which also has two aspects of meaning:
An implication that holds { again the assertive aspect. An implication of an expectedness of { a conformity aspect.
Thus, it is possible now to de ne truly df: = when again interpreting S as the expected world.
If we interpret S as a wishful world 6 one may de ne hopefully df: = ! , while for S the unwishful world, we may put 7 it is feared that df: = ! .
Nested contrastive propositions
As such composite statements are hardly used in natural language, we do not have very clear intuitive guidelines as to how to extend CL 1 to the full Contrastive Logic CL.
However, it is a rather common situation where a logic is inspired by some natural language phenomenon, but after the formation of the right logical abstraction, the logic is`detached' from its origin and treated mathematically,`smoothed' wherever needed. Thereby, it may provide interpretation to constructs that do not re ect any natural language analogon, and could not arise via a translation of the natural language to the logic.
As an example, consider DRT (Discourse Representation Theory 8 13]) described here using the linear notation of 8] (Vol. II, Section 7.4).
A DRS of the form h fx g; fp(x)g i can never arise from a translation of a natural language sentence, but yet admits interpretation (via embedding in models). The simplest DRSs that can arise are of the forms h fx g; fboy(x); cry(x)g i (corresponding to A boy cries ), or h fx g; fx = John; cry(x)g i (corresponding to John cries ).
I start by de ning the`easier' nesting of contrastive propositions within standard propositional connectives. This is done very much as expected, by interpreting the propositional connectives in their standard way at the meta-level. We thus get:
hS; Ai j = ^ iff hS; Ai j = and hS; Ai j = hS; Ai j = _ iff hS; Ai j = or hS; Ai j = hS; Ai j = : iff hS; Ai 6 j =
The negation case is of interest. Negating a contrastive proposition of the form but , by this de nition, is actually A 6 j = ^ or S 6 j = ! : 6 This proposal is due to Ira Forman. 7 Or, more colloquially, I'm afraid that . 8 Readers not familiar with this theory may skip this example without any substantial loss.
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i.e., either negating one of ; in the actual world (negating the assertive aspect), or negating the contrast itself, by negating the implication in the standard world.
Once we have contrastive negated propositions, we may obtain contrastive tautologies by negating contrastive contradiction. As an example, consider Proposition 2.6 j = :(false ):
Proof. Trivial, since A 6 j = false^ . Since neither the disjunction nor the negation of but sentences is common practice in natural language, it is hard to see whether this extension to negation ts such application. One situation where such a negation might be used is in a dialogue as follows:
Mother: I told you to stay home but you did not listen. Child: No! How can we interpret the childs response, negating the mother contrastive statement? Is the child really meaning that either the mother didn't tell him to stay home, or he did listen, or there is no contrast between her telling him and his not listening to her?
As a consequence of the lack of intuitive direction from natural-language usage, the situation here di ers from related problematic situations for negation where it induces presupposition preservation. A typical example is negating sentences with de nite articles (interpreted as a claim of existence and uniqueness). Thus
It is not the case that the (current) king of France is bald. is naturally interpretable in the case of absence of presupposition failure as
The (current) king of France is not bald There does not seem to be an analogous simple interpretation for negating contrast. Hence, I retain here logical negation, as de ned above.
Note that conjunctions 9 of contrastive statements seem to be more natural and more commonly used, as in I slept eight hours but I am still tired and I ate a large meal but I am still hungry. Next, we come to the more complicated issue of nesting the contrastive operators within themselves. The problem is, that our de nition of the satisfaction of a contrastive statement assumes that the component (or components, in the binary case) may be interpreted over one structure! To overcome this di culty, I introduce a syntactic operator ( ), which isolates the assertive part of a contrastive proposition. The latter are ordinary logical formulae (propositional in the current context). I then require those assertive parts (of the corresponding components) to be satis ed in the respective structures. The de nition of is by induction on the syntactic structure of its argument. Note that` ' is idempotent, i.e., ( ( )) = ( ). I now modify (in Table 3 ) the de nition of satisfaction of contrastive proposition to accommodate nesting, obtaining the previous de nition as a special case when the nested operands are propositional.
A simple calculation shows that, for p; q; r propositional, for example, hS; Ai j = (p q) r iff S j = (p^q) ! :r and A j = p^q^r An immediate consequence of the above de nitions is expressed in the next proposition, stating the associativity of the binary contrastive operator. 
When interpreted for but, we get that p but q but r means that there is a`triple contrast' between the three propositional arguments: All three hold in the actual world, but in the standard world any two imply the negation of the third. This is a desirable property, which rather conforms with our intuitive understanding of contrast. This`oblivious' interpretation of the contrastive operators is reminiscent of a phenomenon mentioned in 14], a certain`cancellation of presupposition'. In their explication of the particle even,
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Someone (= = Bill) likes Mary.
When embedded, say as in I just noticed that even Bill likes Mary they argue that the above presupposition is not present. Thus, contrast may fail to propagate under nesting in a similar way as the failure of presupposition propagation under nesting.
In addition to the previously mentioned` at' equivalences, we also get the following by simple truth-value calculation, applying wherever needed:
, (2.5) , (2.6) :(! ) , !(: ) (2.7)
First-order Contrastive logic
Here it is assumed that the two structures S and A have the same carrier (or domain), and are of the same signature. In other words, they interpret the same relational and functional symbols, assigning them possibly di erent extents. For simplicity, avoiding a philosophical debate, it is assumed that (individual) constants in the signature have the same denotation in both structures. This assumption does not in uence the development of the ideas.
The interpretation of the connectives is inherited from the propositional case. However, in order to deal with quanti cation, one has to deal with application of contrastive connectives to open formulae, i.e., formulae with free variables. I would like to make use of the traditional way of handling free variables, by relativizing satisfaction to a valuation (known also as an assignment), binding free variables to elements of the domain. Here we face the need for a decision, as we have two structures over which satisfaction is de ned. Since it was agreed that both have the same domain, only one is used, joint valuation, so to speak, which distributes into the two structures when separate satisfaction is involved. I denote valuations generically by V, and the value of variable x in valuation V by V jxj ].
Thus, the following clauses in the semantic de nition are obtained:
hS; A; Vi j = (x) iff hS; Ai j = (V jxj
hS; Ai j = 9x : (x) iff hS; A; Vi j = (x) for some valuation V.
Similarly, hS; Ai j = 8x : (x) iff hS; A; Vi j = (x) for every valuation V.
Note that these de nitions, as usual, have a strong impact on the Barcan formulae. We still have j = 9x : (x) ! (9x : (x)) and j = 9x : ( (x) (x) ) ! (9x : (x)) (9x : (x)) (but not the other direction), due to the usage of negation in the de nitions of` ' and` '.
3 Contrastive (Linear-time) Temporal Logic Let us start again by considering informally the meaning 10 of already . As in previous cases, it has two aspects in its meaning:
An implication that holds (at the time of reference { see below) { the assertive aspect. An implication of a temporal unexpectedness 11 of { a prematureness aspect. For example, consider the sentence When I arrived in the station, the train was already gone. The rst part of the sentence establishes a time of reference, namely the arrival time. The second half implies, on the one hand, that at the time of reference the train was not in the station (the assertive aspect), and on the other hand that the speaker expected the train to have been in the station at some prior time, to have remained there, and to still being there at the reference time. Note that this expectation lends itself to two explanations:
The speaker arrived when intended, but the train was supposed to leave later than it actually did. The train left on time, but the speaker intended to arrive earlier. I assume here the rst explanation only, assuming that the time of reference is always xed. Thus, by employing a Contrastive Temporal Logic one can capture both aspects, in that the assertive aspect constitutes a (temporal) assertion about the actual world, while the prematureness aspect is a (temporal) assertion about the standard world,
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Every propositional formula is a formula.
For ; formulae: P is a formula (read past ).
S is a formula (read since ). F is a formula (read future , or more often eventually ).
U is a formula (read until ). : ; ^ ; _ etc. are formulae. Table 4 . Propositional Linear-Time Temporal Logic: Syntax again interpreted as the expected world. This aspect of prematureness, in a weaker form, is considered to be a presupposition in 12]. Both worlds have to be temporal structures. Here the compatibility among structures implies also that both worlds use, so to speak, the same clock. This is made more precise below.
In 16] a comprehensive study of already (and related adverbs) is carried out (in the context of their meaning in German). The main aspect of already is conceived there as that of a phase change from an interval satisfying : to an interval satisfying , where the time of reference falls into the second interval. The prematureness aspect is mentioned there as secondary only. In 12], holding in an interval is replaced by a weaker property, merely holding at some past time instant. The relationship of already and expected timing is pointed out also in 11] in a similar context of German. Since my purpose here is to illustrate the use of Contrastive Logics in formalizing natural language constructs, the debate about which aspect of meaning is primary and which is secondary is omitted, leaving for linguists to settle. See 16] for further references to linguistic treatments of this subject.
In order to stay within the simplest temporal logic possible, I restrict the discussion to weak intervals (to be made clearer below). The syntax of PLTL (Propositional (Linear-time) Temporal Logic) is presented in Table 4 .
A structure A for the interpretation of an PLTL formula is an in nite sequence of states s i ; i 0, where a state is an assignment to the propositional variables. In addition, satisfaction is de ned using an auxiliary index i 0, representing the current time, or time of reference, as a position in the sequence. The semantics is de ned recursively, as shown in Table 5 . I use i to denote the ith state in . ; i j = P i there exists some j; 0 j < i, such that ; j j = . ; i j = S i there exists some j; 0 j < i, such that ; j j = , and for every k; j < k i, it is the case that ; k j = .
; i j = F i there exists some j; j i, such that ; j j = .
; i j = U i there exists some j; j > i, such that ; j j = , and for every k; i k < j, it is the case that ; k j = .
Satisfaction of propositional combination is de ned by distribution, as usual. Table 5 . Propositional Linear-Time Temporal Logic: Semantics are used is re ected by replacing the phase changes, implying a : interval directly followed interval (or vice versa), by the interval from the point of change to the current time. This seems to su ce for the current purpose. This would require what in the terms of 16] is called strong negation, which is di erent then the usual logical negation. Finally, I also leave out the introduction and study of the temporal version of the conformal operators.
Conclusions
In this paper I have introduced the notion of bilogics, namely logics interpreted over a pair of structures, in contrast to classical logic and many of its variations, the formulae of which are interpreted over one structure. In particular, I have introduced and studied Contrastive Logic, suitable for expressing contrast and conformality between the two structures involved.
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A major reason for this study was striving towards an extension of truth-conditional semantics to cover several natural-language particles, which have been hitherto considered not to be amenable to such an extensional treatment, and were delegated to the level of non-extensional pragmatics. Precursory ideas that hint towards bilogics can be found in 10], 11] and 17].
Other bilogics should be investigated, to see whether more of the semantics of natural languages can be salvaged and treated more rigorously, using the tools that have proved themselves in so many other areas of research and application.
Expectation and actuality So far, no restriction on the relationship between S, the standard structure, and A, the actual structure, were imposed. Clearly, to obtain interesting and signi cant results applicable to situations in which the need for such means arises, such restrictions are needed. In natural-language applications, one way to proceed is to generate the standard structure based on contextual information gathered from sentences preceding given contrastive proposition, within some discourse.
In particular, one may be interested in a computational interpretation of this generation process. Such an approach is presented in 23], using a so called three-level semantics.
Another source of relevant restrictions may originate from considerations similar to these applied in belief revision theories, where a notion of similarity between structures is introduced, and S can be taken as the most similar structure to A, though nonuniqueness may be problematic here.
While the exact relationship between the expected world and the actual world remains a topic for further research, the approach put forward here can be very helpful in providing a rigorous framework in which the conclusions of such a study can be expressed. Once a theory of expectation and its relationship to actuality has been formed, it can be stated as a collection of non-(bi)logical axioms, characterizing the admissible pairs of structures. Thus, instead of using Contrastive logic as depending on a theory of expectations, one can use it to express and impose such a theory.
Contrastive logic and Modal logic
As already mentioned before, there is a certain similarity between Contrastive logic and Modal logic, in that both allude to more than one world (structure) for their semantic de nition. However, there is a major di erence between the two, due to which the former expresses a relation between the two structures and can be used in making joint statements about the two structures, while the latter does not. The di erence originates from the`free' appearance of both structures (interpreting Contrastive logic) as arguments of the satisfaction relation. This contrasts the quantication over worlds in the semantic de nition of Modal logic, leaving only one`free' world argument for the satisfaction relation.
It might be worth mentioning, that Contrastive logic might be related to Modal logic in another way. The former can be considered as an utterly degenerate special case of the latter, where the Kripke structures interpretations are restricted to one trivial graph only, having two nodes and one accessibility edge between them. It is not clear whether such a representation clari es anything.
Further work needs to be done also in de ning a suitable proof theory, hopefully providing complete axiomatizations of Contrastive Logic in all its variants. In this paper, attention was restricted to the semantic aspects only. Maybe the degenerate view mentioned above may help here.
Symmetry of binary contrast
One of the more puzzling consequences of the theory presented is the symmetry of the binary contrast operator, yielding the equivalence but , but This equivalence was challenged by several authors that followed the path of this paper. In particular, 18] presents an alternative de nition of but, based on an extension of the S5 Modal logic, which renders but asymmetric. However, as the authors there admit, the di erence between but and but is a matter of focus and emphasis, both being captured by the Modal logic introduced there. Since I am only interested in (extended) truth conditions, I remain happy with the above equivalence. There is no way to distinguish the two orders merely by semantic contents.
Another di erence between my presentation and that of 18], which develops contrast in a di erent way, is in the dynamicity of contrast in their approach. In my theory, all expectations are determined`in advance', re ected by the given world S. According to their view, expectations are formed`in the y'. Thus, in but , the expectation of : is formed only after`hearing' . This is an approach more oriented to pragmatics, e.g., utterance situations.
Another attempt to de ne the meaning of`but' is that in 22] , in which a more pragmatically oriented approach is pursued, using a three-valued logic set-up. They also get a non-commutative meaning for binary contrast.
Finally, Computer Science provided a fertile ground for the revival of many nonclassical logics, as well as for the formations of new nonstandard logics. The application of Contrastive Logic in Computer Science is also under current investigation. One potential application, not yet investigated, is in line with 20], where related ideas are used for the speci cation of exception-handling in software systems. I expect Data-Base theory will provide another eld of application.
